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THE GOOD
BUREAUCRAT
Bureaucrats have had a had press: 
they've been blamed for everything 
from the recession to ’economic 
nationalism'. Ian Hunter and Jeffrey 
Minson suggest that many of the 
'remedies ' to bureacracy may be worse 
than the 'disease'.
Nearly everyone agrees that public service bu­
reaucracies need reforming. But to what extent 
and in what directions? Should they be made to 
‘perform’ like corporations in the private 
sector? Or should all bureaucracies—both private 
and public—be made more ‘democratic’ and 
hence more attuned to equity and social justice? 
Here we want to focus on the second question, and 
in particular to show the resistance of bureaucracy 
to democratisation. However, we also want to 
suggest in passing that the ‘corporatisation’ 
of bureaucracies may represent a variation on~ 
rather than a transformation of-their fundamen­
tal nature. As a reference point for the issues 
involved we will focus on the post-Fitzgerald 
Report reforms to the public service in Queens­
land.
The question of whether and how to democratise 
bureaucracy is a perennial one, but it remains 
important, not least for the anxieties and confu­
sions it generates in the relations between ethics, 
politics and government. Of course, a good deal 
depends upon the level at which the question is 
pitched, and especially on what is understood by 
democracy. Current discussions usually conflate 
two quite different senses in which bureaucracies 
might be made more democratic. Seen from one 
aspect the issue might be one of ensuring the 
formal accountability of various public service 
bureaucracies to parliament, and hence in some 
sense to ‘the people’. But the question is also often 
posed in terms of the personal ethics of bureau­
crats. In this case making bureaucracies more 
democratic means encouraging bureaucrats to take 
individual ethical and political responsibility for 
their decisions.
Clearly these different interpretations involve
two very different diagnoses and cures for the 
problem of unelected bureaucratic government. 
The former sees the problem as one of the mechan­
ics of government, something that might be re­
dressed through a renovation of Westminster con­
ventions—for example, the greater use of expert 
parliamentary subcommittees to open the higher 
echelons of the public service to parliamentary 
scrutiny. The second line of analysis leads in quite 
different directions; it construes the problem in 
terms of the failure of bureaucracy to conform to 
the ethical and political principles of individuals. 
Here what is envisaged, presumably, is transform­
ing bureaucracies into little theatres of bureauc­
racy—for example, by introducing democratic 
decision-making procedures that will allow bu­
reaucrats to connect the objectives of government 
to their ethical and political principles as citizens.
Failing to differentiate these different levels 
and kinds of analyses not only obscures the rela­
tion between bureaucratic government and demo­
cratic politics, it also generates quite unreal ethi­
cal-political proposals to make bureaucracy sub­
ject to democracy. Michael Pusey’s Economic Ra­
tionalism in Canberra epitomises this kind of fail­
ure. Pusey’s central argument—that the Austral­
ian state has lost its ‘nation-building’ capacities 
because its senior bureaucrats have lost their moral 
and political faculties— is a clear example of the 
attempt to analyse the shortcomings of bureau­
cratic government in terms of the moral and 
intellectual shortcomings of bureaucrats. For Pusey 
the problem—of which ‘economic rationalism’ is 
a symptom— is that the ‘technocratic’ discipline 
of economics has divorced bureaucrats from the 
ethical and political principles that should govern 
their decisions. These principles, which Pusey 
locates in culture, community and ordinary life, 
provide the values for which bureaucrats should 
have (corporate) personal responsibility. The ab­
sence of such responsibility has transformed the 
bureaucracy into a value-free instrument, ideal for 
dismantling the welfare state and unleashing so­
cially rapacious market forces.
But this alleged failure to embody the collec­
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tive moral personality of the community is not the 
only way in which the non-democratic character 
of bureaucracy can be attributed to the moral 
shortcomings of bureaucrats. Sometimes it’s not 
the absence of values which is held to be the 
problem, but their presence—where they are of 
the wrong kind. This is the way Helen McKenna, 
editor of an important public policy journal, saw 
the problem in her presentation to a public semi­
nar, held by Queensland’s Electoral and Adminis­
trative Review Commission (EARC) to develop a 
code of conduct for public officials.
According to McKenna, the professional ethos 
of the Australian public service merely expresses 
the cultural values of white, anglo-saxon, Protes­
tant males and is therefore out of touch with 
contemporary social and political reality. In a 
society where women have assumed a more promi­
nent role in the public sphere, where 
multiculturalism has fragmented communal val­
ues, but where the community (apparently) de­
mands that public officials take personal responsi­
bility for their actions, the professional ethic of 
public servants has become an obstacle to demo­
cratic government. If they are to avoid the mis­
guided professionalism of ‘Nazi’ public servants— 
in providing technically competent policy advice 
to the government of the day come what may— 
Queensland’s bureaucrats need a code of conduct 
that will allow them to bring their personal and 
political values into play in making ethically 
difficult decisions.
We will return to EARC’s code of conduct for 
public officials below. For the moment, a particu­
lar case may provide us with an initial insight into 
the limits of these proposals for a more democratic 
and organic bureaucracy. In August this year The 
Australian reported on a decision of the Tasma­
nian Ombudsman, concerning a senior public 
servant who had refused to implement a policy 
requiring the installation of condom vending 
machines at Hobart’s Elizabeth College. Com­
menting that “the purpose of colleges is to educate 
students, not to stop them getting pregnant,” the
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public servant argued that he was prevented from 
adhering to this policy of the government of the 
day by his religiously-based moral convictions. In 
ruling that the bureaucrat had acted improperly, 
the Ombudsman formulated the followinggeneral 
dictum: “A  public servant’s moral views ar not an 
appropriate basis on which to make an informed 
administrative decision.”
One doesn’t have to travel as far as Bosnia to 
suggest that community values may be less benign 
than McKenna presumes. Neither need one be a 
dedicated pessimist to wonder whether history 
will ever deliver community consensus on divisive 
moral issues. But these doubts prompted by the 
Tasmanian case are only pointers to a far more 
fundamental problem with the Pusey and 
McKenna diagnoses ofbureaucracy ethical malady. 
In proposing that the non-democratic character of 
bureaucratic government derives from its failure 
to express the values of bureaucrats as citizens or 
community members, these diagnoses make a 
number of implausible assumptions. In particular, 
they assume that the ethical domain is unified and 
that the role of the bureaucracy in a democracy is 
to function as the instrument of this moral will.
The model for this unified moral domain— 
which Pusey locates in ‘culture’ and ‘ordinary 
life’— is the philosophical ideal of the integral 
moral personality whose actions are determined 
by fundamental moral principles. What the Tas­
manian Ombudsman is objecting to, however, is 
in fact the failure to distinguish between the 
different conducts required in discrete ethical 
domains. It is precisely by claiming to act on 
conscience— that is, as a unified moral personal­
ity—that the public servant in question fails to 
honour the duties and capacities (the ethical 
persona) invested in him by his office. The moral 
and intellectual conditions of bureaucratic judge­
ment do not and cannot lie in the. moral and 
instituted ethos of bureaucratic office. While act­
ing in his official capacity the public servant’s 
moral comportment must be governed by the 
ethos of his office, not by the ethic of his religious 
beliefs. In making this demand the Ombudsman is 
insisting on norms of conduct first described in 
Max Weber’s classic theory ofbureaucracy.
Weber refused to accept that there was a 
unified moral personality underpinning and uni­
fying human action, and this refusal is sometimes 
traced to hisNietzchean leanings. Still, in the case 
of his account of bureaucracy, this ethical 
particularism is less philosophically than socio­
logically and historically based. For Weber, the 
differentiation of public administration from pri­
vate conscience is not a moral failure but a histori­
cal achievement rooted in the sociological organi­
sation of the bureaucracy itself.
According to Weber, modem bureaucracies, 
unlike patrimonial officialdoms, are not charac­
terised by the official’s personal loyalty to the chief
or lord. The actual organisation of the bureauc­
racy—fixed salaries, tenure, strict jurisdictional 
demarcation, hierarchical organisation, procedural 
operations—creates the social circumstances in 
which the official’s first loyalty is to the office 
itself. Weber also emphasised that in modem 
bureaucracies access to office is dependent on 
trained expertise, and that the official’s capabili­
ties are the result of‘habitual virtuosity’ in special­
ised office routines— the recording and storing of 
data on files, procedurally determined analysis 
and decision-making.
What Weber called the ‘ethos of office’— the 
capacity of public servants to comport themselves 
according to the routines, norms and objectives of 
the bureaucracy itself—thus cannot be seen as 
simply the expression of WASP values. Neither 
can it be understood as the corporate failure of 
bureaucrats to act on the principles of a collective 
moral personality located in culture, community 
or the ‘public sphere’. Weber sees the bureaucratic 
ethic as a positive and irreducible human com­
portment arising for the technical-ethical organi­
sation of the bureaucracy itself.
For Weber, bureaucratic ‘faculties’ of analysis, 
decision and action do not derive from the con­
science and consciousness of individual bureau­
crats but from technique-based intellectual prac­
tices built into the organisational routines and 
structures of the bureaucracy itself. This then is 
the ultimate reason why it makes no sense to assess 
the non-democratic character of bureaucracy in 
terms of its failure to represent a more fundamen­
tal political will or ethical principle. The conduct 
of bureaucrats in their official capacities is not the 
expression of a fundamental moral personality 
(the community, the people) to which they might 
be held ethically responsible. Rather, this conduct 
is part of an ethical and intellectual comportment 
arising from the bureaucracy as an autonomous 
‘life-order’ and as a set of administrative tech­
niques.
If Weber is right then it's vain and fruitless to 
attempt to judge and govern the conduct of bu­
reaucrats according to criteria deriving from other 
departments of ethical life. This is particularly the 
case where the proposed standards are derived 
from the overly ‘principled’ character of these 
ethics that makes them incapable of comprehend­
ing the spec ific character of the bureaucratic ethos 
and its radical independence of religious and hu­
manist moral absolutes.
In this regard it needs to be kept in mind that 
at the time of its historical emergence— in the 
period of the European religious civil wars, fought 
in the name of various moral absolutes— it was 
precisely the bureaucracy’s capacity to divorce 
public administration from private moral passions 
that made it the privileged instrument of a new 
and radically pragmatic statecraft. This is not to 
say that all attempts to found government on
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religious or humanist principle lead straight to 
Bosnia. It is to say though, that the capacity of 
bureaucracy to divorce politics from absolute prin­
ciples—and thereby raise the survival of the state 
itself into the touchstone of political morality—is 
a contingent historical achievement that those of 
us who live in pacified societies should not take for 
granted. We are in no danger of forgetting the 
evils— including those caused or exacerbated by 
democracy—against which they offer protection.
This m ight seem a vast backdrop against which 
to stage our return to EARC’s proposed code of 
conduct for Queensland’s public servants. In fact 
the distances involved are not as great as they first 
appear. The need for a review of the existing codes 
of conduct for public officials was firmly signalled 
in the 1989 Fitzgerald Report, a document which 
has acquired a political status in Queensland pub­
lic life verging on that sometimes according to 
constitutions. It is not only that all political 
parties swear to uphold its recommendations. 
‘Fitzgerald’ has also functioned as a symbol of a 
more general spirit of political renewal which has 
had effects in domains about which the report 
itself had little to say. For example, that the 
introduction of ‘corporate’ models of manage­
ment into the Queensland public service has been 
accompanied by attempts to reform and strengthen 
equity and merit-protection systems, is at least 
partly the result of the post-Fitzgerald climate of 
reform. This context has also provided an ideal 
environment for reform proposals, like McKenna’s, 
aimed at bringing bureaucracies into line with 
community values.
Clearly much of the impetus for EARC’s re­
view of current codes of conduct for public offi­
cials is a reaction to the corruption associated with 
the Bjelke-Petersen government. Nonetheless a 
good proportion of the recommendations coming 
out of the Report are anything but local in their 
provenance. In fact the proposed codes basically 
represent a reassertion of the classic Weberian 
anti-patronage ethos of bureaucratic office in the 
face of a previously established culture of cronyism. 
Thus a good proportion of the Report’ recommen­
dations is devoted to clarifying the duties of offi­
cials in relation to matters such as gifts, loans and 
entertainments, registerable interests, political 
activity, use of official influence to secure promo­
tions, transfers, appointments and so on.
In a similar fashion, the Report emphasises the 
importance of respecting the merit principle, es­
pecially in personnel decisions internal to the 
public service. This is partly intended as a coun­
terweight to trends favouring the politicisation of 
the public service; but it is also a response to 
‘corporate’ managerial trends away from precise 
definitions of official tasks, tenure and promotion 
on the basis of seniority in favour of setting broad 
objectives (accomplishment of which is left to the 
initiative of officials).
Neither the reassertion of the merit principle 
nor the tighter specification of what is to count as 
corruption would seem to depend particularly on 
bringing bureaucracy into line with democratic 
principles. Certainly, the content and social stakes 
of ‘merit’ today will be very different in some 
respects from what it was in the days of the 1850s 
English civil service reforms. Where, for example, 
the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan Report on the 
British civil service was concerned with it being a 
dumping ground for ‘sickly youths’ or the dimwit - 
ted offspring of the well-heeled, we today are more 
concerned with promoting access for women and 
members of ethnic minorities. Thus one section of 
the recommended code of conduct provides that 
reasonable account shall be taken of cultural di­
versity in determining what is to count as appro­
priate dress. However, whatever McKenna may 
feel, taking account of Australia’s multicultural 
character or the enhanced status of women does 
not require overturning the traditional bureau­
cratic ethos. Reform remains a question of ensur­
ing—as much for the benefit of the organisation 
and the nation as for the individuals themselves— 
that careers in expert and hierarchically related 
positions are ‘open to talents’.
Still less do these reforms seem to require 
bureaucratic decision-making and practice to be 
opened up to the influence of its officials’ funda­
mental personal (including political) values. To 
the contrary, it is doubtful whether the Report’s 
concerns about the blurring of the line between 
political policy and administration—that is, with 
the proportion of public servants’ time and ener­
gies currently dedicated to formulating, anticipat­
ing, or working to shore up party-political policy— 
can be addressed by attempting to go beyond the 
Westminster system in this way.
The ethos of bureaucratic office, with its chief 
point-of-honour the capacity to set aside one’s 
private political, religious, regional or other com­
mitments, should not therefore be regarded as 
obselete. This is not to suggest that bureaucracy 
can or should be entirely depoliticised. It is to say 
though that attachment to the ethos of office at 
least makes officials capable of recognising that 
their obligations as public administrators may 
come into conflict with their political allegiances 
and their moral ideals. There are officials in some 
areas of government—education administration, 
for instance—who seem to be all too happy to 
treat their office as a vehicle for expressing their 
own preferred radical political agendas (both Left 
and Right).
Yet it is precisely over this issue of the place of 
personal values that the Report displays a certain 
confusion. It is repeatedly asserted that as ‘trustees 
of the public interest’ public officials must learn, 
where necessary, to distinguish their personal ethi­
cal standards from those appropriate to the con­
duct of their office. But it is also insisted that
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personal values can and must figure as one ingre­
dient at least in the public servant’s deliberations 
in respect to ethical problems which arise in the 
context of their work.
This is perhaps a case in which the Report 
writers have been poorly served by the language 
and thought of modem ‘personalist’ moral phi­
losophy. Such philosophy is constitutionally in­
capable of distinguishing two quite different senses 
in which values might be ‘personal’. Values may 
also be personal in the sense of simply providing a 
focus for individual moral commitment and ethi­
cal action. Clearly the two senses are not identical. 
Individuals can and do find a (personal) focus for 
moral life in ethoses that derive from impersonal 
ethical institutions, rather than their own indi­
vidual moral reflections. It is in this sense that 
bureaucrats can and should be personally commit­
ted to the ethos of their office even though that 
ethos lies outside their personal moral predilec­
tions or principles.
The implication of this is that a single indi­
vidual may be implicated in multiple ethical ‘per­
sonas’. This can lead to confusion, particularly 
where our habits of ethical reflection assume the 
existence of a single unified moral personality or 
conscience. Neither is the confusion helped by 
the existence of values that overlap different ethi­
cal personas or domains; for example, honesty and 
integrity, which are required in public service and 
in private friendships. But it is made much worse 
by the feeling that the ethos of bureaucratic office 
at bottom amounts to nothing more than a set of 
formal procedural rules which are devoid of sub­
stantive ethical values and hence of anything 
capable of engaging officials’ personal commit­
ments. Something like this feeling is responsible, 
at least in part, for the EARC Report’s attempt to 
pretend that its code of conduct really derives 
from a higher code of ethics ‘proper’, a set of 
fundamental principles appropriate to a demo­
cratic society.
Certainly, bureaucratic ethics can never be 
reduced to formally-defined conduct—least of all 
in the era of new managerialism. There may also be 
good and practical reasons for attempting to in­
corporate into the Code more general principles 
of democratic conduct which are distinct from the 
traditional bureaucratic ethos. Such principles 
might for example help to facilitate the procedures 
of Freedom of Information and Judicial Review, 
by framing them in terms of the rights of citizens 
to initiate reviews of bureaucratic decisions. Yet 
such principles will themselves necessarily be lim­
ited by the bureaucratic character of the review 
procedures. Review requests are indeed passed to 
the officer responsible for the decision in ques­
tion. But in reviewing the decision the officer is 
not required to bring it before the bench of his or 
her ‘innermost’ conscience, only to decide whether 
it was taken with due care in accordance with
promulgated policy guidelines. Verification is pro­
vided by the officer’s supervisor.
The notion that the bureaucracy is a substan­
tive ethical domain in its own right, and the 
associated idea that individuals are involved in 
multiple ethical personas and modes of conduct, 
are no doubt difficult to assimilate, particularly 
from the perspective of a personalist morality 
committed to the generalisation of democratic 
participation. However, the attempt to democra­
tise bureaucracy by grounding it in personal mo­
rality may in fact squander an important ethical 
and political resource: the bureaucracy’s capacity 
to divorce the administration of public life from 
moral absolutes with their incentive to social 
fanaticism.
It is encouraging irt this regard that, in some 
other social and legal domains, commentators 
have been arguing for an approach similar to the 
one that we have been advocating. The American 
philosopher Amelie Rorty, for example, argues 
that taking a less fundamentalist view of the rights 
of the person might lower the social temperature 
of the abortion controversy:
In the case of the abortion issue...apparendy con­
flicting intuitions on the primacy of theological, 
biological or sociopolitical criteria for personal 
identity might be reconciled by regionalizing their 
respective dominance. Even if a particular sectar­
ian theology classifies the fetus as a person, noth­
ing follows about the propriety of importing that 
particular theological conception to legal and 
political contexts. However detailed and articu­
lated it may be, a theological doctrine does not, by 
itself, establish the propriety of its dominance in a 
non-theocratic legal system.
Similarly, in a non-theocratic administrative 
system, the bureaucracy occupies an autonomous 
ethical region that should be strenuously defended 
against both religious and humanist moral 
fundamentalisms.
To conclude, there may be a compelling case 
for making certain bureaucracies more account­
able and responsive to the publics they serve. It is 
even possible that some services currently per­
formed by big state bureaucracies might be better 
run by smaller civic ones. This is a pragmatic 
question concerning the efficiency and equity of 
service delivery, rather than an issue of principle. 
Whatever the case on this issue, it is important not 
to lose sight of the bureaucracy’s crucial civic and 
ethical role in separating public administration 
from moral absolutism. Our concern has been to 
remove bureaucracy from the ‘amoral’ limbo to 
which so much contemporary thought on the 
shape of ‘a democratic society’ consigns it, to 
restore to it something of its civic autonomy and 
ethical gravity. ■
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